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Abstract 
The New Deal for Communities (NDC) Programme is one of the most 
intensive area-based initiatives (ABIs) launched in England.  Between 1998 
and 2010, 39 NDC Partnerships were charged with improving conditions in 
relation to six outcomes within deprived neighbourhoods, each 
accommodating around 9,800 people. Data point to only modest change, 
much of which reflected improving attitudes towards the area and the 
environment. There are problems in identifying positive people-based 
outcomes because relatively few individuals benefit from relevant initiatives. 
Few positive benefits leak out of NDC areas. Transformational change was 
always unlikely bearing in mind the limited nature of additional resources, 
and because only a minority of individuals directly engage with NDC 
projects. This evidence supports perspectives of ABIs rooted in 'local-
managerialism'. 
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Urban Regeneration in England: the policy context 
 
From the mid 1960s through to the end of the 1990s both Conservative and 
Labour governments instigated area-based initiatives (ABIs) to improve 
physical, social, or economic conditions evident in English cities
2
. The 
rationale for, and implications arising from, this strand of urban policy are 
well documented (Atkinson and Moon, 1994; Kintrea, 2007; Shaw and 
Robinson, 2010).  Interestingly, similar schemes, such as Empowerment 
Zones, have also been launched in the United States (Oakley and Tsao, 
2006), and, with programmes such as the EU URBAN community initiative, 
in Europe too (Carpenter, 2006). Governments across developed economies 
have attempted to address particular problems apparent in what are often 
referred to as 'pockets' of social, economic and environmental deprivation in 
cities and large towns.  
A number of principles have tended to underpin English regeneration policy. 
It was central, not local, government which drove this agenda. Working 
with, or through, local authorities, central government designated specific 
urban areas within which programmes would operate. Some ABIs, notably 
Urban Development Corporations, were designed to improve the physical 
environment. Others, including City Challenge and the Single Regeneration 
Budget, were intended to achieve more of an holistic impact on urban 
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 Although many of the problems impacting on Scottish and Welsh cities mirror those evident in 
England, the policy contexts have increasingly diverged; this paper is about English urban policy.  
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problems in the round. But whatever their remit, ABIs were given bounded 
parameters:  they were given relatively limited resources, to operate for 
specific periods of time, in pre-defined 'deprived' localities. Bearing in mind 
this plethora of initiatives, it is not surprising to see contrasting assessments 
of success.  A government funded 1994 project provided a relatively 
favourable overview (Department of the Environment, 1994), whereas a 
2002 overview perceived regeneration policy as being a 'failure' (Gripaios, 
2002).  Whatever the merits of these assessments, the whole urban question 
was in any event to be given a marked re-orientation following the election 
of Blair's 'New Labour' government in 1997.  
One key characteristic of urban policy in the period 1997 to 2010 was that it 
had more of a strategic 'feel' to it than had previously been the case.  An 
Urban Task Force was established, whose report 'Towards an Urban 
Renaissance' (Urban Task Force, 1999) and the associated government 
White Paper (DETR, 2000b), helped 'generate a sense of excitement' and an 
eagerness to see its recommendations implemented (House of Commons, 
2000 xiii). Moreover, even if 'city regions' were to be the main focus of 
attention during this period, that was not to deny the existence of deprived 
pockets within larger conurbations. In 1998 the Social Exclusion Unit 
(SEU), a central government agency, outlined a rationale for a National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal, the 'most concerted attack on area 
deprivation this country has ever seen' (SEU, 1998, 12), one central 
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component of which was the New Deal for Communities (NDC) 
Programme.  
The New Deal for Communities Programme: an overview 
The NDC Programme, launched in 1998, was designed to 'help turn around 
the poorest neighbourhoods' (DETR, 1998, 1), thus reducing 'the gaps 
between some of the poorest neighbourhoods and the rest of the country' 
(DETR, 2001, 2).  39 NDC Partnerships established across England were to 
attack problems within areas each consisting of, on average, 9,800 people. 
NDC Programme wide funding was to be about £2 billion, approximately 
£50 million to each of the 39 areas. The Programme's ten year horizon 
reflected the concern that previous ABIs had not been given enough time to 
instigate change. Each NDC was expected to achieve positive change in 
relation to six outcomes. As will be explored below, there is an important 
distinction here to be made across these six. Three were intended to improve 
these 39 'places': crime, the local community, and housing and the physical 
environment Three were to improve outcomes for people: education, health 
and worklessness.  Taking an overview of the then emerging Programme in 
2004  the National Audit Office suggested that: 'the NDC Programme marks 
a departure from previous area-based initiatives in terms of the significant 
level of funding involved (and) the length of the initiative' (NAO, 2004, 4).  
 
The NDC national evaluation: 2001-2010 
6 
 
In 2001, the then Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), later the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), 
commissioned the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research 
(CRESR) at Sheffield Hallam University, to undertake the 2001-2005 
national evaluation of NDC.  This first phase of the evaluation culminated in 
the publication of an Interim Report in 2005 (NRU/ODPM, 2005) and 
associated commentary (Lawless, 2006). In 2006 CRESR was also 
commissioned to undertake the 2006-2010 phase 2 of the evaluation, final 
reports from which were published in early 2010 (for an overview see 
DCLG, 2010a).  A number of data collation and analysis tasks were central 
to the national evaluation, the most important of which was the biennial 
household survey.  
In 2002 a baseline was established across all 39 NDC areas using a survey 
questionnaire. This addressed socio-demographic, status and attitudinal 
considerations across all outcome areas.  It was based on a random sample 
survey design and culminated in approximately 500 responses from each of 
the 39 NDC areas in 2002.  19,574 responses were obtained from 
individuals aged 16 or over, one drawn at random from each selected 
household. The survey was repeated in 2004. For the subsequent 2006 and 
2008 surveys the overall sample size was reduced to 400 per NDC area, thus 
providing a sample of around 15,800 responses across the Programme as a 
whole for each of these two years. 
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The survey was based on a combined panel and cross-sectional 'top-up' 
design.  In 2004 as many interviews as possible were completed at the same 
addresses as in 2002.  As a result some 10,638 interviews, of the 19,633 
completed in 2004, were held with the same respondents as in 2002.  The 
same principle applied for later surveys. Because of sample attrition it was 
only possible to revisit about 55 per cent of those responding two years 
previously. As a result randomly selected top up interviews were also held 
in all 39 areas to maintain a sample in each NDC area. Final evaluation 
findings exploring change for the NDC panel were based on that group of 
3,554 respondents interviewed at all four waves of the survey: 2002, 2004, 
2006 and 2008 (DCLG, 2010b). 
The most critical problem in evaluating ABIs is that of the counterfactual: 
what would have happened if the initiative had not gone ahead? This issue is 
best addressed though the use of benchmarks which allow for an 
identification of the net impact associated with the NDC Programme: 
change over and above what was happening in other areas. The evaluation 
benchmarked change across the 39 NDC areas with that occurring 
nationally and also within parent local authorities. But these are blunt 
instruments through which to explore change in what are very deprived 
NDC areas.  The decision was therefore taken to carry out the household 
survey in comparator areas. These are located in the same local authorities 
as NDCs, but in non-adjacent wards in order to avoid potential spillover 
effects.  The intention was that as far as possible these areas, of which there 
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were three for each NDC, would be as deprived as the 39 NDC areas.  In 
total 2,014 completed questionnaires were obtained from respondents in 
comparator areas in 2002, 4,048 in 2004,  3,062 in 2006, and 3,100 in 2008. 
In addition some 297 people were interviewed in all four waves, and thus 
represent a 'comparator areas panel'. It has to be stressed that the comparator 
areas are not 'regeneration free controls'. They too will have benefited from 
trends which, in broad terms, have apparently led to improvements in many 
deprived areas throughout England (Tunstall and Coulter, 2006).  Having 
said that few if any will have received more regeneration funding than has 
been allocated to the 39 NDC neighbourhoods
3
. 
This methodology allows change to be addressed in two, complementary, 
ways. First, it is possible to report cross-sectional area based change (DCLG, 
2009c).  Data for all 39 NDC, and their comparator, areas can be compared 
across four survey periods: 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. For analyses 
explored below, change is based on 36 core indicators, six for each of the 
six core outcomes described earlier. Such an assessment of cross-sectional 
area based change is an entirely legitimate approach to evaluating ABIs. But 
there are drawbacks. In particular, this type of evidence is 'contaminated' 
because of population churn caused by households moving into, within, and 
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  To give an indication of this:  for 36 local authorities it is possible to compare total Neighbourhood 
Renewal Funding (NRF) allocations against indicative NDC funding.  These 36 received about 
£360m in NRF funding for 2006/07.  This investment is to pursue regeneration across substantial 
parts of these local authority areas.  Total NDC funding for 2005/06 amounted to about £240m, or 
about two thirds of all NRF funding for these districts.   
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out of regeneration areas, an issue which has attracted considerable recent 
interest  (DCLG, 2009a; Robson, Lymperopoulou and Rae, 2008). Area-
based data thus cannot answer a question which it is not clear any previous 
evaluation has ever been able to address: what happens to those who stay in 
regeneration areas? Changes occurring to this group are of particular interest 
because it is more likely that these can be ascribed to the effects of the 
regeneration programme involved.  By adopting the approach of revisiting 
previous respondents, it is possible to assess the degree to which outcomes 
have changed for the NDC panel, those staying in one of the 39 areas, 
against those staying for similar periods of time in the comparator areas. As 
is flagged up later, even with both area, and panel, data it remains difficult 
to identify positive change in relation to people-based outcomes.  
Nevertheless, the depth of this evidence base across all NDC areas from a 
common base-line of 2002,  provides an ideal opportunity through which to 
assess change for both areas and individuals, a theme of considerable 
importance not just for those interested in  English urban policy, but also for 
those implementing and evaluating ABIs in other institutional contexts.    
 
Changes for places and for people 
As is discussed above, data allows for an exploration of change both to 
areas and also for residents who stayed in these areas, for that six year 
period 2002-2008. Table 1 outlines the 12, of 36, core indicators, showing 
greatest change between 2002 and 2008. Eight of these relate to place-based 
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attributes and include attitudes to the local NDC Partnership, the area and 
the community. Educational attainment levels also showed clear signs of 
absolute improvement. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
However, as is discussed earlier, these indications of change are not 
especially meaningful. What really matters is the degree to which these 39 
areas changed when assessed against other geographies, notably what 
happened in similarly deprived, comparator areas. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the 11, of 36, core indicators which showed statistically 
significant net change over and above that occurring in the comparator areas. 
All but two of these, both indicators of educational attainment, moved in an 
'NDC-positive' fashion. Six positively changing indicators reflect attitudes 
to the area and crime. There is less evidence for net-change in relation to the 
three people-based outcomes, although there is considerable positive change 
with regard to mental health of which more later. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
As is mentioned earlier, the design of the evaluation means that two panels 
have been created: one consisting of those who lived in NDC, and one in 
comparator, areas for that period 2002 to 2008. One of the major advantages 
of panel data is that it is possible to model change in order to take into 
account individual-level socio-demographics notably age, gender and 
ethnicity. This is important in understanding real underlying trends. For 
instance, it is known that older people and women are more fearful of crime. 
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It may therefore be that unless these effects are taken into account, change 
data will reflect not real change but rather the fact that there are more (or 
fewer) women or older people in the sample.  When individual-level 
modelling is undertaken for both panels, then only five core indicators show 
statistically significant change all of which show NDC panel members 
seeing more positive change than those who stayed in comparator areas.  
Three of these relate to improved perceptions of the local place: thinking 
lawlessness and dereliction had improved; satisfaction with the area; and 
thinking the area had improved in the previous two years. The other two 
relate to health: a fall both in those who think their health is not good and 
also in those who consider their health had deteriorated in the previous year. 
 
Discussion  
They key headline finding from data outlined above is that, however the 
evidence is cut, change is relatively modest.  A number of caveats need to 
be made. Although direct comparisons are fraught with problems, this rate 
of change is apparently  not out of line with that occurring in other English 
ABIs such as the Single Regeneration Budget (Rhodes et al, 2005) or EU 
schemes such as URBAN (Carpenter, 2006). It is important too to 
emphasise that it may take many years for the full effects of NDC sponsored 
projects to become evident (Atkinson et al, 2006). Nevertheless, on the 
broad canvas it would be hard to argue that these areas, or those residing 
within them, have seen transformational change across all six outcomes 
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when compared with what happened in other deprived localities over the 
same time period. This raises two questions. Can evaluations capture all of 
the benefits arising from ABIs? And/or is it simply unrealistic to imagine 
any ABI can be a vehicle for major change? 
 
Can evaluations ever capture benefits arising from ABIs? 
One question to explore here is whether the apparently modest changes 
attributable to the Programme reflect, at least in part, weaknesses in the 
design of the evaluation. ABIs are complex programmes to assess 
(Department of the Environment, 1994).  Some of these difficulties are 
intrinsic to the nature of 'area' programmes. In this case the NDC 
Programme involved delivering 39 separate 'packages', to 39 different 
locations, which themselves received other regeneration funding in some 
cases going back more than 40 years. Any ABI evaluation can only hope to 
moderate the effects of some of these methodological complexities, 
informed by central government advice (HM Treasury, 2003). For instance, 
for this evaluation, as is flagged up above, change in NDC areas was 
benchmarked against what was happening elsewhere and in particular in 
other deprived, comparator areas. This helped create a robust counterfactual, 
not least because the comparators operated in similar broad contexts in that 
they were sited in the same parent local authorities as NDCs.  Other 
previous ABIs such as City Challenge (DETR, 2000a), the Single 
Regeneration Budget (Rhodes et al, 2005), and Neighbourhood 
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Management Pathfinders (DCLG, 2008b), have been subject to national 
evaluations. But no previous evaluation of any English ABI has been able to 
explore questions of net change across all relevant regeneration areas and 
their residents, for all outcomes, from a common baseline. 
This depth of data helps explain the nature of change. To give one example. 
As is outlined in Table 2 one of the, perhaps surprising, findings is that 
NDC areas appear to be seeing a statistically significant net change with 
regard to mental health. But few Partnerships instigated many, if any, 
projects designed directly to moderate mental illness. However, individual-
level panel data help explain this apparent conundrum.  Individuals seeing 
an improvement in their mental health were also likely to see a positive 
change in relation to a wide range of other outcomes such as satisfaction 
with accommodation, a positive transition in relation to employment, fear of 
crime and general health (DCLG, 2010b). Substantial improvements in 
mental health did not arise primarily because Partnerships majored on this 
as a policy issue, but because better mental health for individuals was 
associated with other improvements occurring to these areas and their 
residents. Nevertheless, although the depth of data arising from the 
evaluation makes it possible to explore change in a robust manner, two key 
methodological problems remain. Is it possible to identify gains from 
people-based interventions impacting on small numbers of beneficiaries? 
Are benefits lost because people leave regeneration areas? 
(i) The complexities of identifying people-based change 
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One key finding from this evaluation is that it is easier to effect positive 
change in relation to place than to people. It is relatively straightforward to 
introduce initiatives which help people be more positive about their area and 
the local environment. Innovations such as environmental improvement 
schemes, neighbourhood management programmes, more police or 
community police support officers can all help move local resident from 
being-say- 'very' to 'quite' dissatisfied with the area, the environment and so 
on. For many people-based outcomes the transition is more difficult to 
achieve. The classic example here is getting someone to move from being 
workless to being in a job. That is a major transition for many individuals to 
make. In practice NDC funded worklessness initiatives such as training 
programmes, job mentoring schemes and Information, Advice and Guidance 
projects, may well help move individuals along that trajectory towards a job. 
But the ultimate outcome is about moving someone into employment. This 
is a much harder objective to achieve than, for instance, instilling a more 
positive attitude amongst local residents towards their local area. It is just 
harder to achieve people-based outcomes.  
Even if individuals do achieve desired outcomes, it is then more difficult to 
identify these gains through top-down data collection exercises such as 
household surveys. Virtually all NDC Partnerships instigated the kinds of 
place-based improvements outlined in the previous paragraph. The great 
advantages of these sorts of initiatives from the point of view of outcome 
change, is that virtually everyone can see them and, in general, if areas are 
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improving then this will be picked up through household surveys: 
respondents know about place-based initiatives. But this is not the case with 
many people-based interventions. These tend to be directed at certain client 
groups: the unemployed, those willing to go onto training programmes, 
healthy living project participants, the ill, parents seeing improvements in 
their local schools, and so on. Random surveys of 500 or 400 respondents in 
each NDC area will not pick up many, if any, of those involved in, and 
benefiting from, people-based projects. 
Moreover, even if some beneficiaries and their outcomes, are identified in 
household surveys, these ostensible gains will tend to be swamped by what 
is happening in the wider context. This process is best explored within the 
context of worklessness. The evaluation team explored this people-based 
outcome through both case-study work in six NDC areas (DCLG, 2009d) 
and also a top-down analysis using a range of data sources (DCLG, 2009e). 
Case-study work pointed to overwhelmingly positive responses towards 
NDC projects and interventions from local observers including project 
beneficiaries and project managers. But top-down data sources, in this case 
both household surveys and government administrative data, showed little 
in the way of relative improvements in worklessness across all NDC areas. 
Although some projects might well have moved a relatively small number 
of people into jobs, these positive effects are tiny when compared with 
wider processes operating on NDC areas: in 2008 over 50,000 people a year 
were coming off, or going onto, worklessness benefits across the 39 areas. 
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In practice it is much harder to effect, and to identify, gains arising from 
people-based interventions.  
But it is worth pointing out that project-level evidence based on change for 
individuals confirms that positive change does indeed occur.  It was never 
the intention to assess the impact of specific projects on individuals, not 
least because, on average, each NDC implemented around 200 separate 
initiatives. However, one source of evidence helps provide a handle on links 
between specific interventions and individual level outcomes. Full details of 
the methodology involved are available elsewhere (Foden et al, 2010; 
DCLG, 2009b), key headlines from which are, however, relevant to this 
narrative.    
As part of the 2004 household survey, the evaluation team liaised with all 
39 Partnerships to identify four large, well known, local projects. This led to 
evidence being available for 145 projects across all of the Programme's six 
outcomes. All respondents to the 2004 household survey were asked 
whether they had heard of any of these four local projects and, if they had, 
whether they or anyone in their household had 'made use of, attended, or 
directly benefited' from any of them. Respondents who answered positively 
to this latter question were classified as 'beneficiaries' of that particular 
project. Non-beneficiaries were defined as respondents in the same NDC 
who did not report that they or anyone in their household had made use of a 
given named project.   
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Longitudinal panel data was then used to compare outcome change for 
beneficiaries as a group compared with non-beneficiaries. It was possible, 
for a range of indicators, to test for statistically significant differences in 
individual-level change over time between members of these two groups. 
This analysis explored change between the first (2002) and second (2004) 
household survey for respondents interviewed in both waves. The key 
headline is that beneficiaries saw more positive change than did non-
beneficiaries in all of the 17 instances where there was evidence for 
statistically significant difference between changes for each of these two 
groups. Although many of these relationships reflected change in relation to 
place, both education and employment interventions also showed 
beneficiaries seeing more positive change than non-beneficiaries. For 
instance those who had benefited from an employment related project were 
much more likely to move from unemployment to employment between 
2002 and 2004 than was the case for non-beneficiaries. NDC projects 
provided direct benefits to individuals. The relatively limited number of 
beneficiaries from people-based interventions means that these gains are not 
captured by household surveys: but the benefits are real enough for those 
concerned. 
(ii) Outcomes and mobility  
There can be an assumption that areas as deprived as NDCs will always 
suffer from the dynamics of mobility: those gaining from regeneration 
schemes leave to be replaced by relatively more deprived people, thus 
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making it difficult for regeneration bodies to sustain positive change over 
time.  If this were the case, it would have important methodological 
implications in that benefits attributable to the Programme would be 'lost'.  
However, evidence from this evaluation casts doubt on these assumptions. 
Those moving into NDC areas, a process driven in part by migration from 
EU Accession states,  were often less disadvantaged than existing residents 
(DCLG, 2009a). In addition there was little to suggest that NDC areas 
characterised by high rates of mobility were generally associated with lower 
outcomes. And the assumption that individuals gain from projects and as a 
result leave the regeneration area concerned is open to debate.  This 
argument is often couched in terms of worklessness: individuals undertake 
training and mentoring schemes funded by regeneration agencies, gain skills, 
confidence and knowledge, get new or better jobs, enhance their income, 
and use those material gains to move to better housing in better areas. This 
evaluation suggests such a model is based on a series of heroic assumptions. 
For example, as is discussed above only small numbers of people actually 
get jobs 'as a result' of NDC interventions and even if they do so, these are 
unlikely permanently and substantially to enhance income for individuals 
and their households. Of course, people do leave NDC areas. A group of 
about 300 people who left NDC areas between 2002 and 2004 was traced 
(DCLG, 2007). Those leavers tended already to be in employment and were 
generally leaving NDC areas in order to live in better housing in more 
attractive environments. It may be that some people-based outcomes which 
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could genuinely be ascribed to regeneration schemes are 'lost' as individuals 
leave ABIs, but its impact will be marginal.  
 
How realistic is it to see ABIs as vehicles of change?  
Even if evaluations were able consistently to pick up more positive, 
especially people-based, change there are still doubts as to whether it is 
plausible to imagine any ABI, even one as intensive as the NDC 
Programme, could ever lead to transformational change. Three issues merit 
comment here:  the scale of regeneration resources; the limited ability of 
ABIs to reach most people; and the primacy of individual level factors in 
explaining change. 
First, although this is a well funded ABI by historic standards, it has to be 
remembered that the £50m available to each NDC is intended to help 
achieve  positive change  across fully six outcomes, over ten years, in areas 
each accommodating on average almost 10,000 people. This resource 
amounts therefore to around a modest £500 per capita per year. And the 
scale of the NDC resource in these areas is anyway insignificant when 
compared with mainstream funding directed to these localities. It is 
notoriously difficult to tabulate public spend going into any small area, 
especially those which, like NDCs, do not fit neatly within either political 
boundaries such as wards or census output areas. But one attempt at doing 
this suggested that NDC spend in Bradford NDC was less than ten per cent 
of mainstream spend anyway being expended within this particular 
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neighbourhood (DCLG, 2010c). Additional regeneration funding can be 
especially useful in helping to effect change because it is often possible to 
use it flexibly in ways which are generally not possible for mainstream 
spend. But ultimately these resources are minor compared with mainstream 
spend. 
Second, one issue to emerge from evaluation evidence is that most people 
are not directly involved in NDC activities. In each of the four household 
surveys, respondents were asked if they had been involved with their local 
NDC Partnership.  This figure rose slightly over the six year period but still 
only amounted to 17 per cent of all respondents by 2008.  Almost 90 per 
cent of these saw their involvement as primarily participative, for half of 
whom this was interpreted as attending an NDC event or festival. It is not 
realistic to imagine that these relatively low rates of involvement, especially 
with projects which might plausibly lead to individual-level change, will in 
turn sustain positive outcomes.  Most people do not engage with 
regeneration agencies in ways which are likely to lead to measurable 
outcome change, which can in turn plausibly be ascribed to the scheme 
involved. 
Third, there has long been interest in the degree to which change for 
individuals is due to socio-demographic factors and/or area effects (see for 
instance Buck, 2001). Because individual-level data was available for those 
living in either NDC, or in comparator, areas for that six year period 2002-
2008, it was possible to explore this issue in some depth (DCLG, 2010b). 
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Multi-level modelling was undertaken to help explain the relative rates of 
change for those in the NDC panel, when assessed for those in the 
comparator areas' panel. In practice well over 90 per cent of the variation in 
outcomes across the two populations is explained by two sets of factors. 
Socio-demographics (notably age, gender and ethnicity) were significant. So 
too was the extent to which an individual was deprived in 2002. Those who 
were most deprived on any indicator in 2002 tended to see greatest change 
by 2008: they had more 'headroom'.  Hence, only a small proportion of 
relative change could be ascribed to whether an individual lived in an NDC, 
as opposed to a comparator, area. Having said that there was evidence of 
statistically significant better rates of change for those in NDC areas with 
regard to one place-based indicator: satisfaction with the area. Nevertheless, 
change for individuals is not generally associated with whether they live in a 
regeneration area, but rather is rooted in who they are and how deprived 
they were at the outset. Regeneration schemes are not going to make a huge 
difference to individual-level rates of change. 
In the light of evidence presented in this section, there have to be doubts as 
to whether any ABI could ever lead to the sorts of change originally 
assumed of this Programme. Despite early rhetoric, resources were actually 
quite limited; only a small minority of people directly engaged in NDC 
projects; and change is overwhelmingly driven by who people are, not by 
where they live. And all of this within a context, as others have commented, 
where there are fundamental questions surrounding the degree to which 
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positive change can anyway be effected at the local level (Ball and Maginn, 
2004). Problems may well be manifest at the neighbourhood level but 
require policy interventions at wider spatial scales. There remains that 
dilemma central to all area regeneration interventions, and which has been 
debated for more than forty years: problems may be apparent within, but are 
not of, areas. 
 
A Concluding Comment: 'locating' the NDC Programme  
Debates explored immediately above suggest that change was relatively 
modest across the 39 NDC areas, although there are important caveats to 
add to this headline finding such as the fact that it is difficult to isolate 
people-based gains occurring to relatively small numbers of project 
beneficiaries, and the importance of stressing the essentially limited nature 
of additional regeneration resources going into these areas. In this final brief 
section, these findings are used to 'validate' various debates about how best 
conceptually to 'locate' ABIs, one of which perspectives has greater 
purchase on the NDC experience than others.  
Observers have in the recent past looked to social pathology arguments 
(Murray, 1990), 'blaming' residents for their deprivation. Although these 
arguments retain little credibility, some commentators nevertheless see 
vestiges of social pathology thinking embedded in urban policy affected by 
the 1997-2010 Labour government (Cochrane, 2007). However, the idea 
that communities could somehow be 'blamed' for their predicament was 
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never an argument used explicitly by NDC Partnerships or indeed by 
government. Ten year strategies produced by NDC Partnerships consistently 
pointed to the insidious impact of 'structural' problems, notably declining 
and changing labour markets impacting on these areas over many years 
(DCLG, 2008a). A variant of this argument suggests that ABIs may seek to 
impose physical solutions, notably a restructuring of housing markets, to 
address complex socio-economic problems.  Housing played an intriguing 
role in the evolution of the Programme. It did not figure at first, the 
emphasis being placed on the social, economic, and environmental renewal 
of these areas. It was rapidly inserted into outcomes to be adopted by 
Partnerships because there were concerns as to what would be visible in 
these neighbourhoods at the end of ten years. By 2007/8 fully one third of 
Programme spending had been allocated to housing and the physical 
environment, more than for any other outcome and three times as much as 
for each of health, crime and worklessness. This bias towards housing spend 
inevitably raises spectres of the potential 'gentrification' of NDC areas, a 
trend apparent in other aspects of Labour's regeneration programmes 
(Colomb, 2007). And some NDC Partnerships did indeed explicitly seek to 
instil more of a social mix in NDC areas. But caution needs to be employed 
in seeing this Programme as a vehicle through which radically to change 
demographic patterns. Most NDCs never planned for major refurbishment 
and associated tenure change. As a result tenure patterns hardly changed 
between 2002 and 2008, the household surveys showing just a one 
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percentage points increase in owner-occupation over this six year period. 
Notions that regeneration policy can be equated with the gentrification of 
deprived areas, have little purchase on this narrative.    
It has also been argued that, after the election of the 1997 Labour 
government, the 'community' came to be given a more prominent role in 
initiatives such as the NDC Programme (Hill, 2000).  When launched 
ministers apparently told local residents that this was 'your money'. One 
narrative central to the Programme is, however, the steady retreat from that 
position. Through time government instigated a series of measures designed 
to channel, and it could be argued, de-radicalise, more challenging proposals 
from Partnerships. More than 40 Programme Notes were produced by 
central government to guide, and in some cases impose, processes on 
Partnerships. Annual plans were subject to approval by Government Offices 
for the Regions and ultimately central government. A performance 
management framework was developed designed to make Partnerships 
prioritise delivery and ensuring the spending of annual financial allocations. 
In any event, the need to engage with other delivery agencies ensured that 
the vast majority of NDC funded projects were relatively routine: other 
delivery agencies were not going to use their resources to support untried, 
and potentially troublesome, initiatives. Community involvement in this 
ABI was probably greater than in previous regeneration schemes. But it 
would be wrong to see the programme as an embodiment of 'community 
empowerment'.  
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A further perspective is based on relationships between ABIs, such as the 
NDC Programme, and wider socio-economic, 'structural', forces. Some 
would argue that area programmes have inherent advantages to 
governments. They can suggest that, although mainstream services and 
markets are operating 'normally', there are exceptional problems in certain 
localities (Cochrane, 2007). ABIs make it possible for governments to seen 
to be doing something by instigating relatively cheap initiatives through 
which to moderate problems outside the norm, whilst avoiding more 
complex narratives linking deprived areas into wider policy and market 
forces (Atkinson, 2000). Perspectives which see area policy as a veil behind 
which to hide the impact of wider structural forces have implications for all 
ABIs including the NDC Programme.  Certainly in the early years, central 
government was happy to 'localise' the Programme, not wishing NDCs to 
engage with agencies other than those with a neighbourhood level remit. 
But 'conspiratorial' theses have only limited purchase on this story. The 
Programme was essentially designed as a laboratory to see what would 
happen in a relatively small number of deprived neighbourhoods, positive 
experience from which could then be rolled out elsewhere. There was never 
any suggestion that the Programme could address wider structural forces. 
Instead it was part of a raft of 'New Deal' initiatives. Many of these were 
labour market programmes operating throughout the country and which 
were designed to address structural issues. The NDC Programme, on the 
other hand, was explicitly about seeing what could be done in deprived 
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areas by pooling regeneration and mainstream resources to achieve ten year 
holistic, 'place-bound', strategies.  
If the perspectives outlined above have relatively limited resonance for the 
NDC experience, one more 'pragmatic' interpretation seems altogether more 
appropriate bearing in mind the rate and nature of change alluded to earlier. 
The NDC Programme can be seen as a form of 'locality managerialism' 
rooted in a centrally imposed framework designed to re-embed deprived 
individuals within the mainstream  through the delivery of routine projects 
and the spending of annual financial allocations. This was an ABI designed 
to moderate the scale of disadvantage through the funding of interventions 
designed to attack, often in ill-defined ways, the scale of deprivation 
apparent in these 39 localities. This was not a radical attack on deprivation 
within these areas. Rather Partnerships operated in a political world where 
priorities and ministers changed and where pressures to 'deliver' became 
ever more explicit.  Ultimately the most illuminating framework within 
which to locate the Programme is that rooted in what might be seen as a 
series of 'local regimes'. NDC Partnerships operated within, what in the 
early days at least, proved to be relatively volatile political cauldrons. Those 
associated with, governing, or benefiting from, NDCs, had opportunities to 
develop and influence a local political discourse, driven by rewards arising 
from a windfall £50m 'locally determined' budget.  The notion of locality 
based regimes emerging out of the evolving and 'messy' narratives of these 
39 neighbourhood Partnerships, remains an attractive framework within 
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which to locate the NDC experience. Central government directives and 
guidelines laid down frameworks within which the 39 Partnerships were to 
proceed. But the detailed articulation of strategies depended on evolving 
inputs from a range of local actors and agencies: NDC staff, key agency 
representatives, local resident representatives, MPs, councillors, local 
businesses, and so on. The NDC narrative primarily surrounds mechanisms 
whereby local actors came to manage this resource within an increasingly 
constrained delivery framework imposed by the centre. And to bring the 
debate full circle, there is a complementarity between the generally modest 
scale of change outlined in empirical findings developed earlier, and these 
more low-key 'localist' perspectives. Local regimes were able to nuance the 
nature of these ten year programmes, but the relatively limited nature of 
additional NDC resources, combined with central government strictures, 
meant modest outcome change was always the most likely outcome.    
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Table 1: 12 indicators showing greatest improvement: 2002 to 2008 
  
Percentage 
point 
improvement 
2002 to 2008 
NDC improved area a great deal/a fair 
amount 27 
Key Stage 4, five or more GCSEs at A* to 
C 22 
Lawlessness and dereliction index, high 
score 18 
Area got much/slightly better in past two 
years 18 
Fear of crime index, high score 14 
Very/fairly satisfied with area 13 
Feel a bit/very unsafe after dark 12 
Key Stage 3 English, level 5 12 
Gross household income below £200 per 
week 11 
Key Stage 2 English, level 4 11 
Problems with environment index, high 
score 10 
Feel part of the community a great deal/a 10 
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fair amount 
Source: Ipsos MORI NDC Household Survey 2002-2008; SDRC 
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Table 2: Indicators showing statistically significant change relative to 
comparators: 2002 to 2008 
  
Percentage 
point 
improvement 
relative to 
comparators 
2002 to 2008 
Lawlessness and dereliction index, high 
score 9 
SF36 mental health index, high score 7 
Area got much/slightly better in past two 
years 7 
Very/fairly satisfied with area 6 
Taken part in educ./training in the past 
year 4 
Been a victim of any crime in last year 4 
Problems with environment index, high 
score 3 
Health somewhat/much worse than one 
year ago 3 
Been a victim of criminal damage in last 
year 2 
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Key Stage 2 English, level 4 -2 
Key Stage 4, five or more GCSEs at A* 
to C -2 
Source: Ipsos MORI NDC and Comparator Household Surveys 2002-2008; 
SDRC: positive scores indicates more positive NDC change; negative scores 
less improvement, or more deterioration, than comparators. 
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